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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Richard Kwasny appeals the District Court’s order 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of 
Labor and denying his cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Because the record shows no genuine issue of disputed fact 
regarding Kwasny’s violation of the Employee Retirement 
and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) by directing 
employee 401(k) contributions into his Firm’s general assets, 
we hold that the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment. We will therefore affirm, but remand for 
a determination of whether the judgment against Kwasny 
should be offset by a previous Pennsylvania state court 
judgment entered against Kwasny for the same misdirected 
employee contributions. 
I 
 Richard Kwasny is a former managing partner of the 
now-dissolved law firm Kwasny & Reilly, P.C. (the “Firm”). 
While Kwasny was a partner at the Firm, the Firm established 
a 401(k) Profit Sharing Plan (the “Plan”) for its employees, 
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and Kwasny was named as a trustee and fiduciary of the 
Plan.1 Between September of 2007 and November of 2009, 
the Plan sustained losses in the amount of $40,416.302 
because Plan contributions withdrawn from employees’ 
paychecks were commingled with the Firm’s assets and were 
not deposited into the Plan.  
In 2011, the Secretary of Labor received a 
substantiated complaint from a Plan member, which triggered 
an investigation.  The Secretary eventually filed this action to 
recover the lost funds, remove Kwasny as trustee and 
fiduciary of the Plan, and enjoin Kwasny from acting as a 
plan fiduciary in the future. The Secretary and Kwasny 
thereafter filed cross motions for summary judgment. The 
District Court granted the Secretary’s motion for summary 
judgment and denied Kwasny’s. Kwasny appeals.  
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 29 
U.S.C. § 1132(e).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. Our review of a District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.3 Accordingly, we apply the same 
standard as the District Court.4 Summary judgment is 
appropriate where, construing all evidence in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.”5 Our function is not to “weigh 
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”6  
III 
We must first decide whether the District Court 
correctly found that Kwasny violated the Employee 
Retirement and Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”) by 
                                                          
1 Under ERISA, a trustee who exercises control respecting the 
management or disposition of Plan assets is also a fiduciary. 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). 
2 $40,416.30 was never forwarded to the Plan and $2,099.06 
was forwarded late and without interest.  
3 Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015). 
4 Id. 
5 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2015). 
6 Santini, 795 F.3d at 416. 
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directing employee 401(k) contributions into the firm’s 
general assets. Next, we must determine whether the District 
Court erred in denying Kwasny’s motion for summary 
judgment based on his affirmative defenses.  
A 
The District Court’s grant of the Secretary’s motion 
for summary judgment was based primarily on facts deemed 
admitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b).7 
Kwasny never sought to amend or withdraw the admissions, 
even upon invitation by the District Court.8 Kwasny likewise 
does not appeal the order deeming the issues admitted. In 
addition to Kwasny’s admissions, the District Court relied on 
testimony by the Firm’s former bookkeeper, Kathleen 
Meske.9 Kwasny’s evidence, on the other hand, consists only 
of his own declaration, which he claims creates a genuine 
issue of material fact. 
 Matters deemed admitted due to a party’s failure to 
respond to requests for admission are “conclusively 
established” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b),10 
and may support a summary judgment motion.11 Rule 36(b) is 
intended to narrow the triable issues in the case.12  An 
admission is therefore an “unassailable statement of fact”13 
and is binding on the non-responsive party unless withdrawn 
or amended.14 Because Kwasny did not appeal the District 
Court’s order deeming the issues admitted, the admissions 
                                                          
7 Perez v. Kwasny, 159 F. Supp. 3d 565, 569 (E.D. Pa. 2016). 
8 Id. at 568 n.5. 
9 Id. at 570. 
10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b). 
11 Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 
922 F.2d 168, 176 n.7 (3d Cir. 1990). 
12 Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 36(b).  
13 Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786, 803 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (quoting Airco Indus. Gases, Inc. v. Teamsters 
Health & Welfare Pension Fund, 850 F.2d 1028, 1037 (3d 
Cir. 1988)).  
14 Airco Indus. Gases, Inc., 850 F.2d at 1035–37 (“The new 
provisions give an admission a conclusively binding effect . . 
. unless the admission is withdrawn or amended.”) (quoting 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee’s note). 
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continue to bind him in this appeal.15 Accordingly, the 
District Court was correct to treat Kwasny’s admissions as 
established fact.  
Kwasny’s admissions and Meske’s declaration 
together establish a prima facie case of an ERISA violation. 
Under ERISA, trustees of an ERISA retirement plan (such as 
a 401(k) plan) have the following duties: (1) ensure that plan 
assets are held in a trust account,16 (2) act solely in the 
interest of the plan participants and their beneficiaries,17 (3) 
act prudently,18 (4) prevent the plan from engaging in a direct 
or indirect transfer of plan assets for the benefit or use of a 
party in interest,19 and (5) refrain from dealing with the plan’s 
assets for the fiduciary’s own interest.20 Breach of these 
duties results in a violation and may trigger restitution or 
injunctive relief.21 Plan funds protected under the statute 
include money withheld from employees’ paychecks for 
purposes of the benefit plan but not yet delivered to the 
benefit plan.22 The Plan’s trustees are jointly and severally 
liable for money that is withheld but misdirected from a 
plan.23 
                                                          
15 See State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Cty. of Camden, 824 F.3d 399, 
404 (3d Cir. 2016) (“If an appeal is taken only from a 
specified judgment, this Court does not exercise jurisdiction 
to review other judgments that were not specified or ‘fairly 
inferred’ by the Notice.”). 
16 29 U.S.C. § 1103. 
17 § 1104(a)(1)(A). 
18 § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
19 § 1106(a)(1). 
20 § 1106(b)(1). 
21 § 1109(a). 
22 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-102 (“[T]he assets of the plan include 
amounts  . . . that a participant or beneficiary pays to an 
employer, or amounts that a participant has withheld from his 
wages by an employer, for contribution or repayment of a 
participant loan to the plan . . . .”). 
23 Struble v. N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Welfare Trust Fund, 732 
F.2d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1984) (“These cases do not require, 
however, that the plaintiff name all of the trustees as 
defendants. It is a well-established principle of trust law that 
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Here, the record establishes that: (1) “Between January 
2007 and December 2007 Richard Kwasny was a trustee of 
the Plan,” (2) “Between September 7, 2007 and November 
13, 2009, $41,936.73 was withheld from employee 
compensation but not deposited into the Plan,”24 (3) “Richard 
Kwasny directed that employee withholdings intended for 
deposit into the Plan be commingled with the general assets 
of the Firm,” (4) “Richard Kwasny directed that the employee 
withholdings intended for deposit into the Plan be used for 
the benefit of the Firm, and (5) “Richard Kwasny was 
responsible for determining if payroll checks and contribution 
checks were issued . . . between January 2007 and December 
2009.”25 Additionally, the Firm’s bookkeeper, Kathleen 
Meske, declared that Kwasny instructed her to send the 
employee contribution checks to the Plan asset custodian only 
after he paid employee wages, Kwasny himself, and the 
Firm’s outstanding bills. In sum, the facts establish that 
Kwasny, a Plan trustee, used withheld employee 
contributions—protected Plan funds under ERISA—for the 
benefit of himself and the Firm in violation of his fiduciary 
duties. 
Kwasny argues that Meske’s declaration should be 
ignored because she was not privy to all conversations among 
the partners, and unbeknownst to Meske, the partners could 
have decided not to accept a paycheck and therefore did not 
have funds to contribute to the 401(k).  However, the 
possibility that the firm partners may have properly failed to 
contribute funds is irrelevant.  The ERISA violation is 
prefaced on Kwasny’s directing employee contributions to be 
withheld from the employees’ paychecks, not the partners’. 
Similarly, Kwasny’s assertion that he was not the only trustee 
of the Firm and was therefore not solely responsible for Plan 
assets is irrelevant because, as we have already noted, trustee 
                                                                                                                                  
multiple trustees who are at fault may be held jointly and 
severally liable.”). 
24 Kwasny is deemed to have admitted that $41,936.73 was 
withheld in employee contributions, but the Secretary alleges 
that only $40,416.30 was withheld and not repaid into the 
Plan. 
25 J.A. at 117–18.  
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liability is joint and several.26 Moreover, the fact that Kwasny 
was not permitted to cross-examine Meske is irrelevant for 
summary judgment purposes.27 We therefore conclude that 
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
the Secretary was correct.  
B 
We also agree with the District Court’s conclusion that 
Kwasny is not entitled to summary judgment based on either 
of the two defenses he raises on appeal: (1) statute of 
limitations, and (2) res judicata.  
  1.  Statute of Limitations 
Actions such as this one for breach of fiduciary duty 
may not be brought under ERISA after the earlier of “(1) six 
years . . . after the date of the last action which constituted a 
part of the breach or violation . . . or (2) “three years after the 
earliest date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of 
the breach or violation.”28 Put simply, Section 1113 creates “a 
general six year statute of limitations, shortened to three years 
in cases where the plaintiff has actual knowledge.”29 Actual 
knowledge “requires a showing that plaintiffs actually knew 
not only of the events that occurred which constitute the 
breach or violation but also that those events supported a 
claim of breach of fiduciary duty or violation under 
ERISA.”30 
Kwasny asserts the statute of limitations has expired 
because Firm employees and the Department of Labor had 
actual knowledge of the withholdings before 2011, and 
                                                          
26 Struble, 732 F.2d at 332. 
27 Schiavone Const. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1084 
(3d Cir. 1988)) (“[N]either a desire to cross-examine an 
affiant nor an unspecified hope of undermining his or her 
credibility suffices to avert summary judgment.” (quoting 
Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Argonaut Ins. Co., 701 F.2d 95, 
97 (9th Cir.1983))). 
28 29 U.S.C. § 1113. 
29 Kurz v. Phila. Elec. Co., 96 F.3d 1544, 1551 (3d Cir. 1996). 
30 Montrose Med. Grp. Participating Sav. Plan v. Bulger, 243 
F.3d 773, 787 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Int'l Union of Elec., 
Elec., Salaried, Mach. & Furniture Workers, AFL-CIO v. 
Murata Erie N. Am., Inc., 980 F.2d 889, 900 (3d Cir. 1992)). 
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therefore, the Secretary’s 2014 suit is barred. Kwasny relies 
on the following statements from his declaration:  
 Firm employees were aware that their 
contributions were not being deposited into the 
Plan as early as 2007 because it was widely 
known and documented in monthly statements 
to employees.  
 A Department of Labor investigator examined 
all the Firm’s Plan books and records at some 
point in 2010 in response to a complaint by 
Larry Haft, a previous employee of the Firm. 
 The Employee Benefits Security Administration 
(EBSA) received complaint calls in 2006 and 
2010 regarding the failure to remit employee 
contributions to a 401(k) plan. 
The Secretary’s evidence consists of the declarations 
of two EBSA employees: Trudy Logan from the EBSA 
regional office and the regional director Norman Jackson. 
Logan declared that EBSA received complaints in 2006 and 
2010 but the callers submitted no evidence to substantiate 
their claims, and they did not identify the Plan at issue here. It 
was not until Fall 2011 that EBSA received a complaint that 
included substantiating evidence and sufficiently identified 
the Plan to allow it to be referred for enforcement.  Consistent 
with Logan’s declaration, Jackson declared that there was no 
investigation into the Firm’s Plan contributions before 
November 2011.  
We conclude that the District Court correctly held that 
Kwasny’s evidence creates no genuine issue of material fact 
regarding whether the Secretary’s suit was brought within the 
statute of limitations. As the District Court correctly noted, 
whether or not Firm employees were aware of violations is 
legally irrelevant because the plaintiff in this case is the 
Secretary of Labor, not the Firm employees.31 Likewise, we 
                                                          
31 See Landwehr v. DuPree, 72 F.3d 726, 732 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“[T]he limitations period in an ERISA action begins to run 
on the date that the person bringing suit learns of the breach 
or violation.”) (emphasis added). 
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agree with the District Court that Kwasny’s self-serving 
declaration stating that someone from the Department of 
Labor examined the Firm’s books at some unspecified time in 
2010 is insufficient to create a triable issue of fact without 
personal knowledge or facts to substantiate the assertion.32  
Lastly, we agree that as a matter of law, the 2006 and 
2010 EBSA complaint calls do not establish that the Secretary 
had actual knowledge of the ERISA violation. Actual 
knowledge “requires that a plaintiff have actual knowledge of 
all material facts necessary to understand that some claim 
exists.”33 Logan declared that EBSA had no knowledge that 
the Plan was implicated by the complaints until 2011. 
Additionally, EBSA had no knowledge of the specific facts 
that made up the violation because no evidence was submitted 
to substantiate the complaints in 2006 or 2010. Accordingly, 
the District Court was correct in concluding that the 2006 and 
2010 phone calls to EBSA are insufficient to establish the 
Secretary’s actual knowledge of the ERISA claim against 
Kwasny.  
For all of these reasons, we hold that the District Court 
was correct to conclude that Kwasny’s statute of limitations 
defense does not prevent an entry of summary judgment in 
favor of the Secretary.  
2.  Res Judicata 
Res judicata includes the legal concepts of claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion. Claim preclusion prevents 
the relitigation of identical cases, whereas issue preclusion 
                                                          
32 Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 608 (3d Cir. 
2002) (“In order to satisfy the standard for summary 
judgment the affiant must ordinarily set forth facts, rather 
than opinions or conclusions. An affidavit that is essentially 
conclusory and lacking in specific facts is inadequate to 
satisfy the movant or non-movant’s burden.”) (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
33 Gluck v. Unisys Corp., 960 F.2d 1168, 1177 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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prevents the relitigation of discrete issues.34 Here, Kwasny is 
only arguing claim preclusion as a defense.35  
The preclusive effect of a state court judgment in a 
subsequent federal lawsuit is determined by the Full Faith and 
Credit Statute.36 The statute provides that state judicial 
proceedings “shall have the same full faith and credit in every 
court within the United States . . . as they have by law or 
usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are 
taken.”37 The statute has been interpreted by the Supreme 
Court to require federal courts to look to state law to 
determine the preclusive effect of a prior state judgment.38 
Accordingly, we must look to Pennsylvania law on claim 
preclusion to determine whether it applies in this case.  
Under Pennsylvania law, claim preclusion requires 
privity between the parties in the previous case and the 
current suit.39 In its broadest sense, privity is a “mutual or 
                                                          
34 R & J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Cty. of 
Montgomery, 670 F.3d 420, 426–27, 429 (3d Cir. 2011). 
35 Though Kwasny references issue preclusion in his brief, he 
does not outline how the doctrine applies to this case. Indeed, 
because the previous judgment was not in Kwasny’s favor, 
any issues actually litigated would not have been decided in 
his favor and would not advance his case here. Even so, under 
Pennsylvania law, like claim preclusion, issue preclusion 
requires privity between the parties, so the result here is the 
same. See Metro. Edison Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 767 
F.3d 335, 351 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2372 
(2015) (outlining the requirements of issue preclusion under 
Pennsylvania law as including “privity with a party in the 
prior case”). 
36 Metro. Edison Co., 767 F.3d at 350. 
37 28 U.S.C. § 1738. 
38 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 
373, 380–81 (1985). 
39 Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 276 (3d 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Allston v. Lower Merion 
Sch. Dist., 135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015) (outlining the requirements 
of claim preclusion as (1) a final judgment on the merits, (2) 
the same parties or their privities, and (3) a subsequent suit 
based on the same cause of action).  
11 
 
successive relationships to the same right of property, or such 
an identification of interest of one person with another as to 
represent the same legal right.”40 
First, Kwasny argues that the Secretary is precluded 
from bringing its claim against him because a former 
employee of the Firm, Larry Haft, obtained a judgment from 
Bucks County Court of Common Pleas based, in part, on 
withheld employee 401(k) contributions. It is true that the 
Secretary’s suit seeks monetary recovery to vindicate the 
rights of all Firm employees (including Haft) for Kwasny’s 
withheld employee 401(k) contributions. But when the 
Secretary of Labor brings an ERISA suit, the government 
seeks to vindicate broader interests than those of the 
employees. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has noted, the Secretary’s interests also include “the 
reinforcement of public confidence in a private pension 
system” and “supervising the enforcement of the ERISA 
statute,” which “ensure[s] the financial stability of billions of 
dollars of assets which in turn have a monumental effect on 
not only the Treasury of the United States, but on the national 
economy and commerce as well.”41 A private litigant cannot 
represent these interests. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit and a number of appellate courts have 
held that the Secretary of Labor is not bound by the results 
reached by private litigants in ERISA suits.42  
We agree with our sister circuit courts of appeals that 
under ERISA’s statutory framework, “private plaintiffs do not 
adequately represent, and are not charged with representing, 
the broader national public interests represented by the 
Secretary” in ERISA suits.43 Because the Secretary’s interest 
in maintaining the integrity of, and public confidence in, the 
                                                          
40 Greenway Ctr., Inc. v. Essex Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 139, 149 
(3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Ammon v. McCloskey, 655 A.2d 549 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)). 
41 Sec’y of Labor v. Fitzsimmons, 805 F.2d 682, 687–92 (7th 
Cir. 1986) (en banc).  
42 Id.; Wilmington Shipping Co. v. New England Life Ins. Co., 
496 F.3d 326, 340 (4th Cir. 2007); Donovan v. Cunningham, 
716 F.2d 1455, 1462 (5th Cir. 1983); Herman v. S.C. Nat. 
Bank, 140 F.3d 1413, 1424 (11th Cir. 1998). 
43 Herman, 140 F.3d at 1424. 
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pension system is broader than the interests of private 
litigants, we conclude that in ERISA suits, the Secretary is 
not in privity with private litigants and is therefore not bound 
by the results reached by private litigation. Accordingly, we 
agree with the District Court’s conclusion that the Haft 
judgement does not preclude the Secretary from bringing suit.  
Kwasny also argues that, at the very least, the 
judgment in this case should be offset by the judgment 
awarded Haft in the previous litigation. The Secretary agrees 
that such an offset may be appropriate if the previous 
judgment was to recover withheld employee 401(k) 
contributions.44 The District Court concluded, however, that 
the judgment in this case should not be offset because the 
Bucks County judgment dated August 29, 2012 references 
only punitive damages and “Kwasny does not provide any 
other signed court order indicating any other award against 
him.”45 This conclusion is only partially correct. While it is 
true that the August 29th order awards Haft punitive damages 
against Kwasny in the amount of $32,677.15, Haft also 
obtained a default judgment against Kwasny on November 
28, 2011, in the amount of $80,435.85. This amount appears 
to have been calculated including compensation for “401K 
payments withheld from plaintiff’s wages . . . never deposited 
in to the 401K plan.”46 It is unclear from the appellate record 
whether an offset of the Secretary’s judgement is appropriate 
in this case.  We will therefore direct the District Court to 
consider the issue on remand. 
IV 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
District Court’s grant of the Secretary’s motion for summary 
judgment except as to the amount of the judgment. We 
remand the matter for a determination as to whether the 
amount of the judgment should be offset by the Bucks County 
default judgment. 
                                                          
44 See Beck v. Levering, 947 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that offset of a judgment obtained by the Secretary 
of Labor is only appropriate when private plaintiffs actually 
recover concurrent judgments). 
45 Perez, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 574. 
46 J.A. at 79.  
